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A 1-day table-top exercise in San Diego, California, in
December 2004 emphasized voluntary compliance with
home quarantine to control an emerging infectious disease
outbreak. The exercise heightened local civilian-military
collaboration in public health emergency management.
Addressing concerns about lost income by residents in
quarantine was particularly challenging.
I
n a study of quarantine implementation in the greater
Toronto area during its 2003 outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) (1), investigators identified
several factors that influenced compliance with quarantine
restrictions (with rare exceptions, identified contacts of
SARS patients in the area were quarantined in their own
homes). Key factors were fear of income lost while quar-
antined, consistent information about the threat and meas-
ures to contain it, and adequate logistic and psychosocial
support to those confined. Using these findings, we organ-
ized a 1-day table-top exercise in San Diego, California, in
late 2004 that revolved around an emerging infectious dis-
ease caused by an easily transmitted novel respiratory
virus. 
The Study 
Our twin objectives were to promote coordinated
implementation of quarantine measures by the several
local military and civilian agencies and jurisdictions in San
Diego County and to emphasize initial decisions that
encouraged voluntary compliance. In this exercise, quar-
antine referred to restriction at home of possible carriers of
the agent, who were identified through contact tracing. We
also challenged local military commanders to preserve
operational readiness as scenario events unfolded.
Before this exercise, quarantine plans in San Diego
County were in their formative stages. We did not, there-
fore, organize a conventional table-top exercise that tested
an existing plan and identified its gaps. Instead, we used
the exercise as a stimulant for further developing that plan;
throughout the several months that preceded the exercise,
we worked closely with participants to ensure that the
exercise achieved their objectives and goals. 
Contact tracing, issuing verbal quarantine orders and
instructions, and delivering news to the public were gener-
ally well coordinated. When concerns about privacy issues
arose in framing public announcements, a US Department
of Health and Human Services representative assured par-
ticipants that Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Privacy Rule provisions would not
restrict release of protected health information, as neces-
sary, to inform the public of the crisis and instruct them
about protective measures.  
The region’s military public affairs officers formed a
joint information bureau to prepare press releases and sent
a representative to the county’s emergency operations cen-
ter to coordinate military-civilian announcements to the
public. Civilian and military mental health providers, how-
ever, lacked coordination in the delivery of their services.
County officials established a phone bank with a single
800-number for the use of all county residents (military
and civilian), staffed it with operators from several agen-
cies, and provided the operators with Internet-based train-
ing to promote consistency in information released to the
public. Service organizations provided logistic support to
those in home quarantine.
Military commanders pledged cooperation with civilian
public health and emergency operations center officials but
were unable to commit resources in advance because they
needed to protect their operational readiness. The San
Diego County superintendent of schools, who coordinates
all public schools in the county, including those on military
bases, organized Web- and television-based distance-learn-
ing programs so that quarantined students could continue
to receive instruction and submit assignments.
Civilian law enforcement officials characterized the
public health crisis in the exercise scenario as “unprece-
dented.” They also frequently expressed concerns about
carrying out enforcement measures that were requested by
civilian public health authorities and urged county officials
to emphasize public education to minimize the need for
enforcement.
When members of the community who were ordered
into quarantine raised questions about payment of their
wages and salaries while away from their jobs, answers
varied. Military personnel were assured of continuing
income, but some government employees and the privately
employed or self-employed received no assurances. This
issue remained unresolved throughout the exercise because
no program or funds to compensate for income lost by still-
healthy contacts while in quarantine existed at the local,
state, or federal level. In the absence of income insurance,
officials could only appeal to the public’s sense of civic
responsibility to comply with quarantine restrictions.
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could be posted, and perhaps health-related information
provided, at the county’s border crossings with Mexico,
but any general increase in intensity of health screenings
there that lengthened processing of border crossers even
minimally would impede the flow of traffic and become
untenable. (The San Ysidro border crossing, between San
Diego County and Mexico, is the busiest US port of entry.
Future construction of new traffic lanes may allow more
time for health screenings, when necessary.) Making bor-
der health screenings even more problematic at the time of
this exercise was the shortage of both federal and county
personnel to carry them out. 
Conclusions 
Several key lessons were identified for future exercise
planning. First, memoranda of agreement (MOA) or
understanding (MOU) should be developed. Although San
Diego County has had a variety of real-world disasters, it
had relatively little experience with an evolving public
health crisis as depicted in the scenario. Thus, forming col-
laborative and coordinated incident command among local
civilian and military officials took some effort. The lack of
either formal collaborative agreements or even informal
collaborative relationships among local civilian and local
military commanders in the overall management of a
declared communitywide public health emergency was
highlighted by this exercise. In areas with multiple juris-
dictions, whether civilian, military, federal, or tribal, plan-
ning for quarantine must be based on collaborative
command and control, best articulated in MOA or MOU.  
Second, early collaboration of nonmedical officials in
exercise planning should be obtained. Quarantine measures
are initiated by health officers, but they are largely imple-
mented by nonmedical personnel. Success of our exercise
required active collaboration by a wide variety of local pub-
lic officials and nonmedical military officers; some required
convincing that they had crucial roles in what they initially
thought was a purely medical exercise. Communities plan-
ning to exercise quarantine in collaboration with local mili-
tary commanders should enlist, early in their planning, the
cooperation of local military force protection as well as
medical corps officers. Private sector participation in this
exercise was valuable. Implementing quarantine in a com-
munity will have an immediate impact on the business sec-
tor, and its cooperation will promote compliance.
Administrative, nursing, and medical representatives from
the private hospitals in the community also need to partici-
pate and develop consistent approaches to human resources
issues, such as pay and benefits for quarantined employees,
including those in work quarantine, i.e., those who may
have to leave their homes and return to work because of
critical staff shortages during an epidemic.
A third key lesson is to include likely challenges, even
sensitive ones without current solutions. This exercise did
not resolve the critical issue of income protection for those
in quarantine but did identify the lack of this protection as
a potential impediment to voluntary compliance with quar-
antine, highlight its importance for further discussion, and
force participants to craft appeals to the residents’sense of
civic responsibility to mitigate concerns of income loss. 
Afourth lesson is to use exercises to help develop quar-
antine plans, not only to test them. Web-based guidance by
the federal government to civilian public health authorities
(2) and Department of Defense directives to military com-
manders (3) will encourage quarantine planning. Staging
an exercise will develop this capacity and pinpoint defi-
ciencies in interagency collaboration.
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